On the Essence of 'the Rule of China' Based on Two Kinds of 'the End of History'

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Abstract: It has been nearly 30 years since Francis Fukuyama put forward the theory of 'the end of history'. During this period, Fukuyama also expressed dissatisfaction with the political decline of the United States. However, Fukuyama trapped in the framework of 'the end of history', cannot understand the 'China model' which represents the new direction of socialist development. And he still adhered to the basic idea that history would end in freedom and democracy. In fact, Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' has become a farce. Oliver Stuenkel specifically discusses a series of successful measures of 'the rule of china' in his book Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order. Unfortunately, Stuenkel stopped at the external form of 'the rule of china' and did not go deep into the essence of it. 'The rule of China' should adhere to the people-centered principle, completely surpass the theory of 'the end of history' from two aspects of the theory and practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Further, it is important to lead the world trend by building 'a Community of Shared Future for Mankind'.

1. Introduction

Fukuyama believes that with the failure of the socialist model in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, liberal democracy has defeated the Communist ghost that once enveloped the whole capitalist world for a long time in ideology, and has become the end of the ideological field and the final form of government, forming 'the end of history'. Although Fukuyama has not changed his fundamental view in the face of the new changes in China's development for more than 20 years, the reality of China's strong rise has brought unprecedented challenges to Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history'. Stuenkel specifically discusses the practical achievements of 'the rule of china' in his book. Stuenkel's exposition of the historical achievements of 'the rule of china' demonstrates the success of 'the rule of china' from a practical point of view, refutes Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history', and indicates the end of the realistic Western era. However, Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' has the dual demands of the 'universal' theory of liberal democracy and the practical practice of the capitalist regime. Therefore, we need to further understand the motivation and essence behind the success of 'the rule of China', so as to thoroughly sublate Fukuyama's 'universal' theory of freedom and democracy, and thoroughly understand China's direction in the future world.

2. Fukuyama's Theory of 'the End of History' Misreading the 'Chinese Model'

Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' has caused a wide range of debates. His 'Hegel-Kojève' idealism tendency and one sidedness of the understanding of socialism (communism) need not be mentioned. In order to stick to the 'universal value' of freedom and democracy, Fukuyama affirmed China's achievements in recent years, but believed that "whether from the perspective of economy, politics or culture, the Chinese model is unsustainable" (Chen Xueming, 2013). Fukuyama's understanding of the Chinese model is capricious and full of prejudice against China's social form.

2.1. Mechanical Determinism of the Market Economy

At the beginning of his argument, Fukuyama believed that the Marxist Leninist central planned economy lacked technological innovation and could not adapt to the modern complex economy. In terms of economic form, Fukuyama equates liberalism with 'free market economy', and regards the attitude towards the legitimacy of private property and private enterprises as the criterion to examine whether the state is free or not. As long as private economic rights are protected, it is a free state. Otherwise, it is not a free state (Fukuyama, 1992, p.44). Therefore, only a complete market economy in line with the historical development mechanism of capitalism, can we achieve reasonable economic development. Although market-oriented totalitarian countries may develop better economically than democracies, there is no doubt about the relationship between economic development and liberal democracy, but there is no theoretical explanation (Fukuyama, 1992, p.125).

Fukuyama equates freedom mechanically with complete market economy, which naturally negates China's status as a socialist market economy. Fukuyama's mechanical determinism of the market economy represents the traditional western liberalism central idea. Fukuyama overemphasized the role of liberal democracy or liberalism in economic development, his real purpose is to equate freedom with private property, to make people dependent on property, and to achieve his intention of advocating freedom and democracy.

2.2. The Rigid Tendency of Freedom and Democracy

Fukuyama mechanically divided liberalism and democracy into two independent concepts. Fukuyama believes that a free country may not be so democratic. Similarly, a democratic country may not be free, that is, individual rights and minority rights are not protected (Fukuyama, 1992, p.44). Through the sophistry of the western liberal democratic system, Fukuyama denies that China is a democratic country and the rationality of the Chinese model.

In 2010, Fukuyama acknowledged that China may be a successful example of replacing liberal democracy in social form (Li Yitian etc, 2011). Even American democracy has nothing to teach China. However, Fukuyama Facing the reality of the decline of American politics, did not look for the reasons behind it. The root of this problem lies not only in the fact that Fukuyama and the western centralism tradition represented by Fukuyama confuse the ideal of liberal democracy with the realistic liberal democratic system (Derrida, 1994, P.78), and equate the thought of liberal democracy with that peculiar to the capitalist liberal democratic system, but also in the fact that they regard freedom and democracy as either or. In this way, even if we seek a balance between the two, we will often take care of one thing and lose the other, and it is difficult to avoid the occurrence of political decline.

2.3. Stereotyped Mode of Cultural Interpretation

Fukuyama believes that "in the process of transforming some traditional values into democratic values, culture produces forms of resistance due to the existence of cultural differences. Culture not only affects a country's ability to establish and maintain political liberalism, but also affects a country's ability to operate economic liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992, p.233). This constitutes an obstacle to democratization. Starting from the traditional Western ideas, Fukuyama not only ignores the reality of China's overall sustainable and healthy development, but also thinks that Chinese culture is incompatible with Marxism Leninism. Chinese traditional culture is an important reason why the Chinese model is not worthy of imitation and unsustainable, which is a misunderstanding of Chinese culture. Jacques Derrida said frankly that Fukuyama's book the End of History and the Last Man is the 'Gospels'. "Yet the book is not as bad or as naive as one might be led to think by the frenzied exploitation that exhibits it as the finest ideo-logical showcase of victorious capitalism in a liberal democracy which has finally arrived at the plenitude of its ideal, if not of its reality" (Derrida, 1994, p.70)

Fukuyama always demonstrated the irrationality of the Chinese model in the framework of Western liberal democracy, and lacked the basic understanding of 'the rule of china'. Therefore, we

should always take a critical attitude towards Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history'.

3. Stuenkel's 'Termination Theory' Promotes the Practical Value of 'the Rule of China'

Although Fukuyama strongly advocates his theory of 'the end of history' and denies the Chinese model, the facts speak louder than words. The implementation of China's new development concept fully demonstrates the sustainability of the Chinese model. In particular, Stuenkel's specific exposition of the achievements of 'the rule of china' in Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order declares the bankruptcy of Fukuyama's 'the end of history'' from a practical point of view.

First, Stuenkel realized the parochialism of traditional western centralism and tried to break away from the traditional western centralism and replace it with a dialectical multi polarization view of history. The west is not the cradle of freedom and democracy. Behind its rise lies the profound Eastern source: instead of leading the establishment of the global economic system. Europe has joined and developed the existing economic system (Stuenkel, 2016, p.5). As Stuenkel said, "Indeed, Western-centrism has led us to retroactively co-opt many influential ideas and norms such as democracy, human rights, and diplomacy as Western "(Stuenkel, 2016, p.4).

Second, Stuenkel realized the important role of China's rise in the process of economic multi polarization. The rise of China is the core factor in the process of economic multi polarization. Even Fukuyama can't ignore China, the only dynamic modernization force at present. Stuenkel thinks that China is still the only country that can really challenge the western leadership order. In view of the most important difference in the assumption of China's future development path, that is, the unsustainable economic model (which is exactly the main point that Fukuyama denies the Chinese model).

Thirdly, Stuenkel properly understood the scientific nature and rationality of China's political system. Fukuyama criticizes China as an authoritarian government and accuses the totalitarian Chinese political system of no democracy. But Stuenkel's attitude towards the Chinese political system is just the opposite. Stuenkel agreed that China is a kind of virtuous political system, "comes close to the best formula forgoverning a large country" (Stuenkel, 2016, p.68). As Daniel Bell said: "they tend to value democracy because of its positive consequences rather than valuing democratic procedures per se" (Daniel, 2015, p.6). Stuenkel firmly believes that the rise of China will avoid the possible conflicts caused by the rise of China.

Fourth, Stuenkel correctly recognized the unique significance of the promotion of Chinese cultural soft power, and accurately analyzed the unique value of 'the rule of China' to the world. 'The rule of China' shows a bright future. Unlike Fukuyama's insistence that the United States needs to continue to promote democratic and liberal values, China has never put forward ideological coercion. China has taken its own unique road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which is in sharp contrast to the anomie of the liberal order in the post western era.

Under the multilateralism of global competition, China is promoting global development through the practical practice of 'One Belt And One Road' and striving to create a win-win situation. The rise of parallel order indicates the end of a liberal order.

4. The Deficiency of Stuenkel's 'Termination Theory' on the Theory of 'the Rule of China'

Although Stuenkel's argument is of great positive significance, it still fails to completely get rid of the influence of western centralism. Pure factual discourse also lacks a deep understanding of 'the rule of china', especially the essence of 'the rule of China'.

4.1. Ghostly Western Centralism

Although Stuenkel tried to break away from the traditional western centralism, his discourse was inevitably influenced by western centralism to a certain extent. As Stuenkel said, although there is a bias of Western centrism in the similar saying of "rise of the rest" (Stuenkel, 2016, p.61), this usage can also be reasonable. Perhaps it is because even if he denies western centralism, he has to discuss

it under the framework of the existing Western norms. In addition, Stuenkel has a rigid tendency of western centralism in some aspects. In Stuenkel's view, "communism is very much a Western idea" (Stuenkel, 2016, p.6). In this way, Stuenkel confused Marxism with western centralism and fundamentally ignored the exploitation of capitalism and Marx's critical nature of capitalism, the so-called western liberal democratic system. Therefore, Stuenkel's lack of awareness of the dangers of western centralism is natural. Although Stuenkel seeks to prove the correctness of 'the rule of China', he repeatedly quotes Fukuyama, the proponent of 'the end of history', and takes Fukuyama's theory of 'Chinese politics will decline' as a rebuttal to the western view.

4.2. Lack of A Thorough Understanding of Chinese Culture

Stuenkel cited a large number of facts about 'the rule of china' in his argument, he still did not have a thorough understanding of the spirit of Chinese culture in some aspects.

Stuenkel thinks that the rise of China has a fundamentally different meaning from "the United States - the Soviet Union", but from time to time he compares China and the United States as opposite poles. Finally, although Stuenkel agrees with the bright prospect of the rule of China' in the future global competition, he also believes that "just as the United States intervened in Iraq outside of international law (2003), so will China (and possibly other emerging powers) break the rules if necessary, or be selective about them".(Stuenkel, 2016,p.187).Similar to Fukuyama's Misreading of Chinese traditional culture, Stuenkel did not have a deep understanding of "harmony", the core of Chinese cultural spirit, nor did he have a thorough understanding of the basic principle of inclusiveness, which comes down in one continuous line with Chinese cultural spirit, so he inevitably misunderstood some phenomena to a certain extent.

4.3. Failure to Go Deep Into the Essence of 'the Rule of China'

Fukuyama's so-called 'coming to an end' does not refer to intermittent major events, but macro 'history': that is, the history of human development is understood as a unique, continuous and evolving process. Stuenkel tries to discuss the success of 'the rule of china' in an all-round way. Stuenkel, who is still influenced by western centralism, not only lacks a thorough understanding of the spirit of Chinese culture, but also can't deeply explore the motivation and essence behind the success of 'the rule of China', nor can he explain the theoretical basis for 'the rule of China' to solve the complex debate of the future global order. Therefore, on the basis of dialectical treatment of Stuenkel's achievements in advocating 'the rule of china', we need to further explore the essence of 'the rule of china' and clarify the theoretical origin of 'the rule of china' in sublating western liberal democracy and leading the world trend.

5. The Theoretical Essence of 'the Rule of China'

Only by adhering to historical materialism to discover the way of social and historical laws, that is, to explore the real last motive force of history, can we truly find the laws of social history, and then uncover the mystery contained in Stuenkel's so-called 'the rule of China'.

5.1. Adhering to the Leadership of the Communist Party of China -- the Theoretical Premise of 'the Rule of China'

Behind the rule of China is the institutional advantage based on the overall interests of the people. An important manifestation of the contradiction of Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' lies in his repeated attitude towards the Communist Party of China. On the one hand, Fukuyama recognizes and praises the ruling ability of the Communist Party of China; on the other hand, he denies the Chinese model and the rationality of the Communist Party of China's political power due to the theory of 'the end of history'. In fact, although Stuenkel agrees with China's political system and praises China's model, he also ignores the decisive role of the Communist Party of China in this series of behaviors. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the real founder of 'the rule of china' in Stuenkel's view. Even if Fukuyama denies it, it is a typical phenomenon in western countries, including the United States, that national policies are vacillating

because of representing different interest groups. Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' will always be falsified by 'the rule of China' under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

5.2. Upholding and Developing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics -- the Theoretical Basis of 'the Rule of China'

The reason why Fukuyama dared to put forward the theory of 'the end of history' lies in the failure of the rigid socialist model. But Marxism has never been a dogma, and the rigid socialist model of the Soviet Union is not really socialism. Adhering to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics is the basic premise and guarantee of 'the rule of China'.

First, the socialist economy with Chinese characteristics can fundamentally overcome the drawbacks of Fukuyama machinery's market economic determinism, which is the core reason for Stuenkel's understanding of the rapid development of China's economy. It is possible to possess all the positive achievements created by the capitalist system without going through the Kafting Gorge of the capitalist system. Second, the socialist politics with Chinese characteristics fundamentally takes into account Fukuyama's values of freedom and democracy, and overcomes the defect of the separation of freedom and democracy in the west, which is the reason why the Chinese elite political system identified by Stuenkel is suitable for governing big countries. Thirdly, the socialist culture with Chinese characteristics fundamentally refutes the incompatibility of Marxism Leninism and Confucianism in Fukuyama's view that Chinese culture contains, realizes the good fit between the communist ideal and the core idea of Chinese traditional culture, and seeks the consistent core value pursuit of the two. At the same time, this is the reason behind Stuenkel's view that China's rise will not lead to conflict, and also the root of Stuenkel's misunderstanding of China's basic principles of foreign relations. Fukuyama's fallacy that the incompatibility of Marxism Leninism and Confucianism leads to unsustainability is self-defeating.

5.3. A People-centered Approach -- the Theoretical Core of 'the Rule of China'

Fukuyama pursues people's universal recognition, but makes people dependent on property, and tries to control people with Western hypocritical free and democratic idealism. Although Stuenkel saw the specific value of 'the rule of china', he put the reason why 'the rule of china' led the new international order on a series of superficial policies and facilities, and put the ultimate goal of 'the rule of china' only at the end of the Western era. To some extent, Stuenkel is still idealistic on the basic issue of social history. They did not see the decisive role of the masses in the creation of history, and ignored the fundamental pursuit of 'the rule of china', that is, the concern for the free and all-round development of human beings in reality. Marxism has never been in pursuit of emancipation of ideas. Historical materialism holds that the people are the main body of history and the decisive force to promote social progress. Only taking the people as the center is the only touchstone to judge the 'universal value'.

5.4. Constructing the Community of Human Destiny -- the Theoretical Path of 'the Rule of China' Leading the Trend

The theory of 'the end of history' puts theory above practice and guides 'the end of history' from the universality of recognition. China, on the contrary, aims to show the world how China does things, not to educate the world how to do things. Xi Jinping's new idea of the destiny of China with Chinese characteristics is the insisting on the core theory of 'the rule of China' centered around the people.

Fukuyama realized the important role of community in leading the world trend, but Fukuyama continued the outdated political community thinking in the period of us Soviet bipolar hegemony, that is, "states sharing republican constitutions" (Fukuyama, 1992, p.281). In fact, Fukuyama is reversing history. It is impossible to build a truly effective community under the narrow framework of freedom and democracy in Fukuyama.

Xi Jinping's thought of human destiny community in China's new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the application and development of Marx's 'free people's Union' at this stage. The idea of a community of human destiny has grasped the main characteristics of this stage of

development. This is the theoretical essence of 'One Belt And One Road' that Stuenkel fails to understand, and the fundamental reason why' the rule of China' can resolve complex debates about the future global order.

6. Conclusion

Although emerging powers are remaking global order indicates the end of the western leadership order, "The book's title refers to the coming end of this unusual concentration, and not to a world in which today's rules and norms no longer matter" (Stuenkel, 2016, p.187). Just as dying capitalism does not mean that capitalism will soon perish, so does 'the rule of China' ending the Western era. Therefore, the bright prospect of 'the rule of china' does not mean that we can be blindly optimistic, but that we should practice the great practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics under the guidance of the theoretical essence of 'the rule of china'. We should not only adhere to the road, theory, system and cultural confidence, but also adhere to the basic national conditions of the primary stage of socialism, strictly abide by the long-term and arduous nature of socialist construction, and always be alert to the strategy of peaceful evolution of capitalism. There is a long way to go for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

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